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DOCTRINE OF INDIVISIBILITY REVIVED?
NINTH CIRCUIT CONFIRMS COPYRIGHT
EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE HAS NO RIGHT TO
TRANSFER LICENSE ABSENT OWNER'S
CONSENT: GARDNER V. NIKE, INC.
Peter H. Kangt and Jia Ann Yangtt
Copyrights are an important and fundamental type of intellectual
property.] Entire sectors of the economy, from software companies to
the entertainment industry, derive substantial value from goods and
services by virtue of a coherent and comprehensive copyright system.
As such, the transferability of copyrights, either through license or
outright sale, is an important area in which the U.S. legal system
should set clear guidelines. However, because the concept of
transferability of copyrights is in tension with an author's moral or
economic motivations to control or restrict downstream use (or
misuse) of a copyright, over many decades, the courts and Congress
have taken different approaches alternatingly to restrict or liberalize
the transferability of copyrights.
Thus, in the early part of the last century, copyright law
recognized significant differences between an assignment and a
license of a copyright. In this period, if a transfer of a copyright was
categorized as a license, the grantee of the right did not have standing
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1. For example, other than patents, copyrights are the only other type of intellectual
property specifically enumerated in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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to sue in her own name, did not have proprietary rights in the license,
and did not have the right to re-sell or sublicense unless she was
expressly authorized to do so. 2
This so-called doctrine of
3
indivisibility resulted from judicial interpretation of the 1909
Copyright Act. For most of the twentieth century, the doctrine of
indivisibility affected the jurisprudence governing assignments and
licenses of copyrights, and persisted until the adoption of 1976
Copyright Act (the "1976 Act").4
The 1976 Act, in resolving problems created by the doctrine of
indivisibility, eradicated most of the doctrine and expressly provided
for the divisibility of copyrights. 5 Therefore, under the 1976 law, an
exclusive licensee of a copyright is granted standing to sue,6 and an
exclusive license is considered a transfer of copyright ownership.7
Thus, under the facial, literal terms of the 1976 Act, there would
appear not to be much substantial distinction between an assignment
and exclusive license.
Nevertheless, the legacy of more than half a century of the
dominance of the doctrine of indivisibility still impacts exclusive
licenses, even under the 1976 Act. The Ninth Circuit has recently
decided a case that brings back the doctrine of indivisibility from
obscurity. In the recent decision of Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 8 the Ninth
2.
For a general discussion of the distinction between an assignment and a license under
the 1909 Copyright Act, see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 10.01 (2001) [hereinafter NIMMER].
3.
Under the Doctrine of Indivisibility, the bundle of rights of a copyright was said to be
"indivisible." Therefore, an assignment must be a transfer of the totality of rights. Any transfer
of less than a totality of rights would only constitute a mere license. See id. § 10.01 [A].
4.

See NIMMER, supra note 2.

5.
The 1976 Act defines "transfer of copyright ownership" as an "assignment, mortgage,
exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any
of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of
effect, but not including a nonexclusive license." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Under this section,

an exclusive license is considered a transfer of copyright ownership. In addition, § 201 (d)(2) is
"said to constitute an explicit statutory recognition of the principle of divisibility of copyright."
NIMMER, supra note 2, § 10.02[A]. Section 201(d)(2) provides:
Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision
of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by
clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is
entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded
to the copyright owner by this title.
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2). However, "some residue of the impact of indivisibility" remains as to
nonexclusive licenses under § 101. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 10.02[A]. Nonexclusive licenses
are outside the scope of the present discussion.
6.

17 U.S.C. § 501(b).

7.
8.

See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Circuit held that an exclusive licensee does not have the right to9
transfer the license absent the copyright owner's consent.
Acknowledging that this is a case of first impression under the 1976
Act, the court concluded that the limitation on an exclusive licensee's
right to re-sell, imposed by the doctrine of indivisibility, survives the
1976 Act, despite the explicit changes in the new law.' 0 Thus, despite
the literal language of the 1976 Act, the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Gardner v. Nike, Inc. has the effect of treating the transferability of
exclusive licenses differently from the transferability of assignments
of copyrights.
This Case Note will examine the Ninth Circuit's holding and its
reasoning, as well as analyze the court's rationale in the case. This
Case Note will also examine the court's reliance on patent law and
will demonstrate that, in fact, an opposite outcome is likely to result
under the patent law. In the end, the question remains whether the
court struck a proper balance between the monopoly power and
economic benefits conferred to the original copyright holder/licensor
and the competing interests favoring free transferability of property
for maximum economic efficiency.
I.

GARDNER V. NIKE:

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1992, Nike and Sony entered into a licensing agreement under
which Nike granted Sony certain rights to a cartoon character, named
"MC Teach," created by Nike.' The parties agreed that the license
was exclusive.' 2 The rights under the licensing agreement included
the right to use the character, and any modification or alterations,
in perpetuity throughout the world on and in the packaging of
phonograph records, in publicity, advertising and allied
exploitation of the records, in television programs or motion

9.

See id.

10. Id. at 776, 781.
11. Id. at 776.
12. Id. It is interesting to note that the Gardner case was premised on the assumption that
the agreement between Nike and Sony was an exclusive license. Plaintiff Gardner seemingly
never disputed this characterization. However, the 1976 Act treats the bundle of rights as
divisible and thus the distinction between an assignment and an exclusive license is no longer
that clear under the current law. In the opinion itself, the Gardner court acknowledged the new
law "calls into question the distinctions that were previously drawn." Gardner, 279 F.3d at 778.
Therefore, it is an open question whether a different result would obtain had Gardner argued the
Nike/Sony agreement was in fact an assignment and not a license. Due to the traditional free
transferability accorded to assignments, the entire issue of whether an exclusive license could be
freely transferred might have been avoided. See NIMMER, supra note 2, § 10.01 [C][4].
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pictures embodying the musical compositions embodied on the
records, on educational material and on clothing .... 13
In June 1996, Sony transferred all its rights in the exclusive
license to Gardner, who, in turn, used the "MC Teach" character in
various educational materials.' 4 As a result of Gardner's use, Nike
threatened legal action against Sony, Gardner, and their proposed
licensees. 5
After Gardner's initial declaratory relief suit in state court was
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Gardner filed again
in federal district court seeking declaratory relief in December 1999.16
In June 2000, Nike moved for summary judgment, claiming
Gardner lacked standing to sue because the transfer of the license by
Sony was invalid. 17 Gardner
also filed a motion for summary
18
judgment on the same day.
On August 1, 2000, the district court granted Nike's motion and
denied Gardner's motion for summary judgment.' 9 District Judge
Baird agreed with Nike that the assignment of the exclusive license
by Sony to Gardner was invalid without Nike's consent under the
1976 Copyright Act. 20 Therefore, Gardner did not have standing to
bring the declaratory relief action. 21 Gardner appealed.

II.

GARDNER V. NIKE:

NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION

Noting this is a case of first impression under the 1976 Act, the
Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by examining the state of
law under the 1909 Act.22 In Harris v. Emus Records Corp., a case

13.
Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1283 n. 1 (C.D. Cal 2000).
14. Gardner,279 F.3d at 776.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 776-77.
17. Id. at 777.
18. Id.
19. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 2002).
20. Id. The District Court's opinion raised some discussion and scholarly comments.
See, e.g., Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Control Without Interest: State Law of Assignment, Federal
Preemption, and the Intellectual Property License, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8 (2001); Robert W.
Clarida, Negotiating License Agreements, 7 No. 10 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 1 (July 2001);
Exclusive Copyright Licensee May Not Sublicense or Assign its Rights Without Copyright
Owners' Consent, FederalDistrict Court Holds; Nike 's Exclusive License to Sony of Rights in
Nike's Copyrighted Cartoon Character "MC Teach" Were Not Validly Sub-licensed or
Assigned to Third Party, Because Sony 's Consent Was Not Obtained, 22 No. 8 ENT. L. REP. 8
(Jan. 2001).
21.
Gardner,279 F.3d at 777.
22. Id.
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decided under the 1909 Act, it was held that "copyright licenses
(whether exclusive or not) were 'not transferable as a matter of
law.', 23 This conclusion was based on three rationales: the doctrine
of indivisibility, policy considerations, and analogous rules in patent
law.24
Under the doctrine of indivisibility, anything less than a transfer
of a totality of rights under a copyright was considered a mere
license.
Unlike an assignee, a licensee was not regarded as a
copyright proprietor, and thus did not have standing to sue for
copyright infringement.26 A licensee also had no right to transfer the
license unless she was expressly authorized by the original licensor.27
By prohibiting the transfer of the license without the copyright
owner's consent, the rule preserved the owner's control over the use
of the work downstream.28 This result was said to strike a balance
between two competing interests: anti-monopolization versus the
incentive for creativity.2 9
The Circuit Court next addressed the abolition of the doctrine of
indivisibility as to exclusive licenses under the 1976 Act. After
examining relevant sections under the Act, the court concluded that
Congress had solved many problems created by the doctrine of
indivisibility under the prior law. 30 For example, Congress explicitly
granted an exclusive licensee standing to sue in her own name. 31
Moreover, an exclusive license is considered a transfer of ownership
and "this definition calls into question the distinctions that were
previously drawn between an assignment and an exclusive license
under the indivisibility doctrine. 32 The Circuit Court, however,
pointed to the silence of the statute regarding the exclusive licensee's
right to transfer the license.3 3 The issue the court faced, therefore,
was whether the doctrine of indivisibility survived as to the
transferability of exclusive licenses under the 1976 Act.34
23.

Id. at 777-78 (quoting Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir.

1984)).
24.

Gardner,279 F.3d at 778.

25.
26.

Id.
Id.

27.

Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002).

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 778-79.
Id. at 779.
Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 780.
Id. at 779.
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The Circuit Court looked to the text of the statute in search for
the answer. A crucial provision for the court, § 201(d)(1), reads in
relevant part, "the ownership of a copyright may be transferred in
whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of
law. .. ,35 According to the court, § 201(d)(1) "enables the owner to
to another party,
transfer any fraction of his or her ownership interest
' 36
thereby making that party a whole or joint owner."
Gardner had argued that Sony, as an exclusive licensee, was the
"owner" of the "MC Teach" character under § 101, 37 and § 201(d)(1)
allows Sony to transfer to Gardner Sony's interest freely as the owner
of that exclusive right.3 8 Despite the broad grant of the copyright
owner's right of transfer, the court nevertheless determined that the
language in § 201(d)(2) curtailed the application of § 201(d)(1) to
exclusive licensees.3 9
In reaching this conclusion, the court's analysis focused on
specific language in § 201(d)(2), the so-called "protection and
remedies" clause. 40 The second sentence of § 201 (d)(2) provides that,
"[t]he owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent
of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the
copyright owner by this title. ' The court interpreted § 201(d)(2) as
providing only "protection and remedies" to the owner of the
exclusive right and not all the "rights" afforded to a copyright
owner. 42 According to the court, the term "protection and remedies"
includes the right for an exclusive licensee to sue in her own name,
but does not include the right to transfer the exclusive license.43
Furthermore, relying on the principle of statutory construction, the
court held that the more specific term of § 201(d)(2) prevails over the
more general language of § 101 and § 201(d)(1). 44 Therefore, the
court held that § 201(d)(1) did not apply to the present case, and thus

35.

17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2000).

36. Gardner,279 F.3d at 779.
37. For the definition of "transfer of copyright ownership" under 17 U.S.C. § 101, see
supra note 5.
38.

Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2002).

39.
40.

Id. at 779-80.
See id. at 780.

41.

17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2000).

42.

Gardner,279 F.3d at 780.

43.

Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 780 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002).

44.

Id. at 780.
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§ 201(d)(2) only provided "protection and remedies" but not the
rights.45
The court also inferred from Congress's silence on the issue of
transferability of an exclusive license that Congress had no intention
to change the prior law.46 In the court's view, Congress's failure to
address this issue, coupled with the use of the limited terminology
"protection and remedies," evidenced the survival of the doctrine of
indivisibility as to the exclusive licensee's right to sell or sublicense
further.47
In addition to the textual statutory argument, the court further
presented policy reasons to support its conclusion. Citing Harris,the
court emphasized the importance of preserving the copyright owner's
control of the identity of licensees.48 The court evinced concern that
disputes over issues such as the solvency of sublicensees and the
scope of the use of a copyright by sublicensees would foster further
litigation if the original owner were excluded from the negotiations
with a sublicensee.4 9 Consequently, the court held that the burden
should be placed on the exclusive licensee to obtain the licensor's
express consent before the exclusive licensee may assign its rights to
a third party (such as Gardner). The court believed this decision
struck the balance between preserving the original
copyright owner's
50
control and favoring divisibility of copyright.
III.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF GARDNER V. NIKE

A. Is the court's interpretationof§ 201(d) consistent with the
Congressionalintent infavor of divisibility of copyrights?
In holding against the transferability of an exclusive license
without the licensor's consent, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the
statutory language, especially the use of the phrase "protection and
remedies." The court viewed this phrase as more limited than the
term "rights," even if the protection and remedies would include the
exclusive licensee's "right" to sue in her own name. 5'
This
interpretation of the words in the statute (which the district court
45.

Id. at 779.

46.

See id. at 780.

47.

Id.

48.
49.

Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id.

50.

See id.

51.

Id. at 780 n.4.
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One

commentator has suggested that "protection and remedies" can be
"rights" in a sense, and every "protection" can be a "right" insofar as
it is a "right to protection. 5 3 Thus, the Gardner court's argument
seems more "semantic than substantive., 54 Moreover, at least one
other lower court has read the "protection and remedies" language
more broadly than the Gardner court to include "the right to

transfer."' 5
Furthermore, when taken together with other sections dealing
with an exclusive licensee's rights, the court's limited reading of §
201 (d)(2) becomes more problematic. As mentioned above, Congress
explicitly abandoned the doctrine of indivisibility and made
copyrights assignable in whole or in part.56 Section 101 clearly
accorded an exclusive licensee the status of an owner of that
particular right. 57 These sections thus eliminated the distinctions that
previously existed between an assignment and an exclusive license
under the prior law. In the Gardner opinion itself, the court
acknowledged that there might no longer be distinctions between the
two. 58 The Ninth Circuit also cited Nimmer for the proposition that
"[a]n exclusive license.., is equated with an assignment [under the
current law].. .."59

Given the unequivocal Congressional intent favoring divisibility
of copyrights in the 1976 Act, it would appear inconsistent to hold
that Congress would have intended to preserve the doctrine of
indivisibility only for an exclusive licensee's right to sell or

52. See Fellmeth, supra note 20, at 22 (discussing the district court's opinion in Gardner
v. Nike, Inc.).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). This
case was discussed by the Gardnerdistrict court opinion in a footnote, where the Gardnercourt
rejected the In re Patient court's interpretation of the rights and protections of the copyright
owner as being incorrect. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1287 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
However, the Ninth Circuit neither addressed this case nor commented on the district court's
interpretation of this case in its opinion.
56. Section 201(d)(2) is "said to constitute an explicit statutory recognition of the
principle of divisibility of copyright." NIMMER, supra note 2, § 10.02[A]. In addition, §
201(d)(1) expressly makes the ownership of a copyright assignable in whole or in part. ("The
ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part .. ") 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(l)
(2000).
57. "'Copyright owner', with respect to any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
58. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002).
59. Id.
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sublicense further. It appears illogical that an exclusive licensee has
to suffer this restriction on transferability of the license, while in all
other respects an exclusive license is treated like an assignment under
the 1976 Act. The court's exacting interpretation of the "protection
and remedies" language would appear not to be strongly persuasive of
a legislative scheme to treat exclusive licensees so differently from
assignees in this one respect.
In addition, Congress has expressly excluded nonexclusive
licenses from "transfer of copyright ownership" 60 and thus knew how
to manifest clearly an intention to maintain the doctrine of
indivisibility for nonexclusive licenses. It therefore can be argued
that the disparate legislative treatment of exclusive licenses and
nonexclusive licenses demonstrated that the doctrine of indivisibility
should have been completely eliminated for exclusive licenses under
the 1976 Act.
The court's rationale that Congressional silence was meant to
indicate that the prior law should remain unchanged is unsatisfying.
The record is not clear whether Congress's failure to address this
issue expressly was a deliberate choice or merely an oversight. The
court noted that Congress was aware of the limitation on an exclusive
licensee's right to transfer, but "chose not to explicitly address this
issue in the 1976 Act.'
However, inferring Congressional intent
62
from Congressional silence is often difficult to do convincingly.
Using similar logic, it could be argued that, without doing so
consciously, Congress did not add an exclusive licensee's right to
freely transfer copyrights under the 1976 Act, because the 1909 Act
did not address this issue expressly either.63

See NIMMER, supranote 2, § 10.02[A].
61.
Gardner,279 F.3d at 780.
62. Here, the Gardner court assumed that Congress expressly granted an exclusive
licensee standing to sue, thus Congress's failure to give an exclusive licensee a right to transfer
explicitly meant that Congress did not intend to grant that right. As Judge Posner has pointed
out, this type of statutory construction is based on the false assumption of legislative
omniscience and on the erroneous assumption that all legislative omissions are deliberate. See
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 800, 813 (1983).
63. The Gardner court stated that "neither the 1909 or 1976 Act explicitly addresses this
issue." Gardner,279 F.3d at 780.
60.
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B. Transferabilityof Licenses: A different result likely under
patent law
In its discussion of policy concerns, the court cited to analogous
situations under patent law to support its conclusion.64 However, the
two patent cases cited by the Gardner court (In re CFLC, Inc. and
Unarco Industries,Inc. v. Kelley, Co., cited by the Harriscourt) both
dealt with nonexelusive licenses and not exclusive licenses.65
Because nonexclusive licenses are treated very differently from
exclusive licenses under the 1976 Act, it is difficult to equate the
policy considerations underlying nonexclusive licenses with policy
considerations for exclusive licenses. The court's reliance on these
nonexclusive license cases is unsatisfying and was, perhaps,
misplaced.
Moreover, it may well be that an opposite result on
transferability without consent would be reached under patent law.
Like copyright, the bundle of rights that make up a patent are also
divisible.66 Unlike copyright, however, the distinction between an
assignment and a license of a patent is determined by the extent to
which these rights were transferred.6 7 If all substantial rights under
the patent were granted, the grantee will be considered the owner,
regardless of the label or characterization of the transfer. 68 That is, an
exclusive patent license will be treated like a patent assignment if all
substantial rights were transferred to the licensee. Therefore, an
exclusive licensee with substantial rights under the patent will be able
to sublicense the patent rights in the same way
an assignee is able to,
69
without consent of the original patent owner.
This demonstrates the difference in treatment accorded to an
exclusive patent licensee with substantial rights under the patent law.
While the Gardner court reiterated the appropriateness of looking to
64.
Gardner,279 F.3d at 780-81.
65.
In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley, Co., 465
F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972).
66.

See Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1342

(9th Cir. 2001).
67.

See id. at 1344.

68.

See id.

69. It would be interesting to examine whether the "substantial right test" in patent law
could be applied to copyright law. Under the doctrine of indivisibility of the 1909 Act, this test
could have provided arguments helping to avoid the harsh results for exclusive licensees in
some cases. Under the 1976 Act, though, since an exclusive license is "equated with an
assignment," see Gardnerv. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002), there would appear to

be little need to adopt this test from the patent law absent further restrictions on exclusive
licensees.
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patent law for guidance, 70 a closer examination of patent law reveals
that the opposite result would obtain and thus undercuts the Gardner
court's analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Gardner case is the first appellate decision nationwide
discussing an exclusive copyright licensee's right to transfer without
consent of the original copyright owner.71 It therefore remains to be
seen whether the Ninth Circuit's position will be followed in other
circuits. As this Case Note has discussed, the court's statutory
interpretation relied on fine distinctions between semantically similar
terms. It is also unclear whether the court's proffered policy
considerations are consistent with Congressional intent. Although the
practical effect of the Gardner decision is to impose the burden to
negotiate for the copyright owner's consent either as part of the
original exclusive license or in subsequent negotiations to attempt to
transfer the license, the monopolistic power of the original copyright
and the economic benefits thus conferred upon the original licensor
cannot be easily dismissed as insignificant in many commercial
contexts.
Accordingly, the Gardner decision leaves open to question
whether a fair or economically optimal balance has really been
reached between the creator's rights and the public interest in general.
As we approach nearly a century of jurisprudence and legislative
action in the arena of transfers of copyrights, it is now apparent that
further evolution and exploration of these complex legal issues will
continue. For companies in the software, media, content-providing,
entertainment, and on-line industries, counseling and proper analysis
in this complex area at the intersection between transactional,
licensing, and copyright law will be necessary to ensure maximum
protection of rights and opportunities.

70. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778, 780-81 (9th Cir. 2002).
71. In re Patient addressed the same issue in dicta, because that case involved a
nonexclusive license in the bankruptcy context. In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237,
240 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).

